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ABSTRACT

Noting that the individualized language of society tends to limit attempts at building community-based interpersonal communication, this paper addresses the dilemma by investigating the therapeutic language of Carl Rogers in light of insights from work by Maurice Friedman and also from "Habits of the Heart: Individualism, and Commitment in American Life" (Bellah, et al., 1985). The paper reveals that Friedman saw psychologism as a problem in Rogers' therapeutic language and as the beginning of society's individualized language. Using interview data gathered by the authors of "Habits of the Heart," the paper also examines how therapeutic language, in general, is aimed at helping the self, not the community, and that the language of individualism is so common and powerful in everyday speech that those who wish to express community concern find they lack the vocabulary to do so. Implications and questions are raised for research on interpersonal ethics, such as the lack of choice in the established, individualized, interpersonal language of society, how a community language of interpersonal communication might be described, and how this language would contrast with and complement current interpersonal communication. (SRT)

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INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION ETHICS:

PSYCHOLOGIZING AND HABITS OF THE HEART

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INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION ETHICS:

PSYCHOLOGIZING AND HABITS OF THE HEART

This article examines a significant ethical problem in contemporary communication posed by Maurice Friedman and the authors of Habits of the Heart, that many Americans today are pursuing community unsuccessfully, due to their over-reliance on individualistic language. If communication ethics is defined as requiring choice-making and our linguistic rootedness in individualism makes the choice of community conceptually impossible, then an ethical problem of serious magnitude confronts daily interpersonal communication. Friedman analyzes Carl Rogers' work as a metaphor of this ethical dilemma of wanting community without a language to sustain it; interview data gathered by the authors of Habits of the Heart confirms this individualistic linguistic tendency in contemporary interpersonal communication.

Introduction

In 1986, we can still legitimately ask, "What is Interpersonal Communication?" Although articles in the early seventies by Ilardo[1] and Stewart[2] provided an initial answer, conceptual differences in current theories of interpersonal communication once again prompt the same question. The diversity of interpersonal communication scholarship was captured by Ayres (1984):

> ... conflicting advice is offered on what should be taught in interpersonal communication courses... some scholars are calling for extensive descriptive work while some scholars feel there is too much emphasis on cognitive processes while others feel cognition is a critical ingredient in interpersonal exchanges, etc.[3]

Ayres proceeded to review four major approaches to interpersonal communication: dialogue, cohesion, message process, and rhetoric. In his discussion of dialogic communication, Ayres cited Buber and Rogers.[4] He predicted that the dialogic approach would be increasingly challenged

by more pragmatic approaches to interpersonal communication.[5] In short, he was suggesting that there are limits to the dialogic perspective in interpersonal communication.

This article explores Ayres' statement concerning the limits of dialogic communication by examining the work of Carl Rogers.[6] This article views Rogers' approach as a metaphor representing an ethical dilemma of the limits of individualistic language for the invitation of human community. Insights from the works of Maurice Friedman and Habits of the Heart are cited in the investigation of the limits of Carl Rogers' therapeutic language and individualistic language, in general, for building a community based understanding of interpersonal communication.

Before elaborating on the thesis of this article the term ethics will be clarified. In Speech Communication literature there are multiple approaches to communication ethics, as described by Chesebro, Johannesen, Jensen and Arnett.[7] However, in these various approaches, there is a common thread--to be an ethical decision-maker one must be permitted to make choices. Bormann contends that only when choice is present can the question of communication ethics or lack of be addressed.[8]

For the question of interpersonal communication ethics to be raised, one must be able to choose. Friedman and the authors of Habits of the Heart suggest that some people cannot choose community, due to an individualistic linguistic system. The inability to choose between individualism and community, due to linguistic limitations makes an ethical decision or choice-making action much less viable. Choice-making in interpersonal communication ethics necessitates a linguistic system capable of nurturing and sustaining both individualism and community. Only in the choice-making between the different world-views of

individualism and community can the discussion of communication ethics be meaningful. The goal of this article is not to solve the linguistic problem of community, but to describe the limits of individualistic language for community building by exploring Friedman's analysis of Rogers' theory and the interview data gathered by the authors of Habits of the Heart.

The rationale for selecting Friedman's writings and Habits of the Heart to examine the limits of Rogers individualistic vocabulary in the invitation of human community is two-fold. First, Friedman is familiar with Rogers' writing and orientation. He moderated the famous Buber/Rogers dialogue.[9] Friedman's work is also known in Speech Communication, evidenced by the seminar centered on his understanding of confirmation at the SCA convention in Denver, 1985.[10] Second, Habits of the Heart is referenced because of its emphasis on the limits of therapeutic and individualistic language for the development and maintenance of human community.

The terms individualism and community are not sharply defined by Friedman or by Bellah and associates in Habits of the Heart. Both parties explore general societal trends and rely on broad-based common sense definitions. Individualism for the above authors implies concentration on oneself via self-growth, self-promotion, and self-concern. Community suggests an appreciation of others with a desire to further the life of the collective group, not only oneself. Perhaps most importantly, these two approaches conceptualize meaning arising from different places--in an individualistic orientation, meaning emerges from oneself and in a community orientation it is given birth in a common life together.

Neither Friedman nor authors of Habits of the Heart are framing an

either/or of individualism or community. They recognize the significance of both orientations. However, they suggest that community is currently secondary to individualistic advancement.

> [Friedman suggests that] Many psychotherapists and psychologists who today recognize the essential importance of mutual relations between persons still see these relations largely as the function of the individual's becoming and the means to that end. As long as dialogue is entered merely as a means to the end of health, maturity, integration, self-expression, creativity, 'peace of mind,' 'positive thinking,' and richness of experience, it will not even produce those things.... The relation between persons takes place not only in the 'I-Thou' of direct meeting but also in the 'We' of family and community....It is not only the fate of smaller and larger groups that depends upon the common speech-with-meaning. If man does not recover the genuineness of existence as We, he may cease to exist at all.11

Friedman's general call to move from individual concern to community sensitivity is echoed in the recent work Habits of Heart.

> Perhaps the crucial change in American life has been that we have moved from the local life of the nineteenth century--in which economic and social relationships were visible and, however imperfectly, morally interpreted as parts of the common life--to a society vastly more interrelated and integrated economically, technically, and functionally. Yet this is a society in which the individual can only rarely and with difficulty understand himself and his activities as interrelated in morally related ways with those of other, different Americans. Instead of directing cultural and individual energies toward relating the self to its larger context, the culture of manager and therapist urges a strenuous effort to make of our particular segment a small world of its own.12

Friedman, as a philosopher, and the authors of Habits of the Heart, as sociologists, leave us with a similar message: too much individual concern limits the possibilities of community. Community is an attitude of concern for the generation before our own and the one following, requiring long range concern, not just consideration for the moment or my interests. The authors of Habits of the Heart refer to this understanding of community, as a "community of memory." Such a community has a history, a story told collectively at different times in order to

provide a memory or live tradition to which one can belong. Understanding of oneself is rooted not just in individual accomplishment, but in a loyalty and commitment to a people. "Where history and hope are forgotten and community means only the gathering of the similar, community degenerates into lifestyle enclave."[13]

In summary, this article examines Friedman's and the authors' of Habits of the Heart recognition that an individua`istic vocabulary is inadequate for building and promoting community. Carl Rogers' theory of interpersonal relations is used as a metaphor of the problem of aiming at community with an individualistic vocabulary. The next section examines Friedman's exposure of this problem in Rogers' work.

Friedman on Psychologism and Rogers

Before beginning this section, it should be clear that Friedman and this author have much respect for the work of Carl Rogers. The quality of Rogers' commitment to his task is not questioned. A recent article by Rogers, "Toward a Human Science of the Person," reveals that even with his considerable reputation, he is still open to "new" insights from other fields.[14] And according to client testimony, Rogers' effectiveness as a counselor seems to continue, as well.[15]

Rogers' remarkable career has withstood attacks from psychotherapists, behaviorists, and even rhetoricians.[16] Rogers has been a model of what Buber called a "great character." He has understood his psychological tradition well enough to challenge it where and when necessary.[17] In many ways Rogers' biographer is right, Rogers' orientation is as American as apple pie.[18] He is optimistic, willing to explore new territory, and a genuine supporter of individuals against

systems that curtail personal growth. However, Rogers' theory can be viewed as a metaphor of an ethical dilemma in interpersonal communication--there are limits in attempting to discover community with an individualistic language, which is at odds with the work of Friedman and the insights in Habits of the Heart.

Friedman, Philosopher of Religious Studies, Philosophy, and Comparative Literature at San Diego State University, recently completed an M.A. in Psychology and his newest works center on the psychological realm. Although this article primarily references Friedman's most recent scholarship, some "earlier" Friedman themes still guide his thinking: "image of the human,"[19] and "community."[20] These two terms are central to Friedman's examination and critique of psychologism.[21] As this section reveals, Friedman conceptualizes psychologism to be a problem in Rogers' therapeutic vocabulary and the ground for the promotion of an individualistic linguistic system.

Although this article focuses on Rogers' work, it is significant to note that Friedman would not conceptualize all dialogic theories as limited by individualistic language. Referencing material from Speech Communication journals, this article is in agreement with Arnett's conceptualizing psychologism as the central notion separating Rogers and Buber.[22] In fact, Friedman recognizes Buber as a major critic of psychologism. Friedman did not always conceptualize Buber and Rogers at odds on this issue. His 1955 article in Cross Currents reveals an appreciation of the similarities of Buber and Rogers.[23] However, Friedman eventually recognized fundamental differences between the two theories, which he stressed in a 1970 article.

...the psychological--in the double sense of the experience of

> the psyche and the theories of psychology--often became for me a touchstone....I was influenced most strongly at first by Eric Fromm; later, also by the 'non-directive' or 'client-centered' therapy of Carl R. Rogers....[However, after seven years of studying Buber's work]....I understood that what was at issue was an anthropology, an understanding of man, and the whole question of epistemology, of how we know. This radical change in my philosophical understanding has issued into a critical approach to the very men who helped me on my way--Jung, Fromm, Rogers.24

The epistemological issue involves where meaning arises in a communicative exchange. Psychologism chooses the inner person and Buber the "ontology of the between."[25] While space does not permit exploring Buber's work or his the notion of the "between," it can be said that the "between" Buber offers is not grounded in the individual and is a radical critique of psychologism.

> The monstrous, the dreadful phenomenon of psychologism so prevails that one cannot simply bring about healing, rescue with a single blow. But the disappointments belong to the way. There is no other way than that of this miscarrying. That is the way of faithful faith.[26]

Friedman shares in the critique of psychologism[27] as one of his former students, Richard Stanton, revealed in the introductory chapter of Friedman's Contemporary Psychology: Revealing and Obscuring the Human. "Distortions arise out of the psychologizing of reality: perhaps the most noteworthy one emerges when we start to think of experience as something happening inside of ourselves rather than as something happening between us and the world."[28]

In Contemporary Psychology (1984), Friedman defined psychologism.

> Psychologism is a habit of mind. It is the tendency to divide the reality that is given to us into two parts--one of which is an outer world into which we fit ourselves and the other of which is and inner psyche into which we fit the world....We do not actually exist divided into 'inner' and 'outer' except for certain useful purposes. In reality we are a whole in every moment in streaming interaction with everybody and everything....[this division of] psychologism robs life of its finest reality.29

Friedman does not consider psychologism unsupportable, but grounded in a paradigm he rejects. The struggle against psychologism is not over right and wrong, but the image of the human being. As early as 1961, Rollo May suggested that the battleground between psychology and psychoanalysis would be over the "image of man" or the image of the person.[30] Friedman argues that in literature and narrative the human image is revealed.[31] This article carries his thesis even further, stating that the battle over the "image of the human" in different approaches to interpersonal communication is that of individualism and community.

Friedman frequently refers back to his major work on human image, The Hidden Human Image, for definition.

> The Human Image, as I use the term, is not only an image of what man is, but also an image of authentic personal existence that helps him discover, in each age anew, what he may and can become, an image that helps him rediscover his humanity. 'Image' in this context means not a static picture but a meaningful, personal direction, a response....The human image embodies a way of responding.[32]

The human image is a direction or set of possibilities implied by a narrative, story, or communication theory. There are competing images of the human suggested by different interpersonal communication theories. Psychologism leads us toward an image of the person that is anthropocentric and a breeding ground for individualism. It is this image of the person that Friedman questioned, as he compared Rogers' recent work to that of Buber. Friedman recognized numerous similarities between the work of the two men, as did Anderson.[33] But Friedman also called attention to fundamental differences in images of the human.[34] Rogers' commitment to the inner self (or what Friedman refers to as psychologism) presents a much different image of the person than does Buber's interpersonal dialogue.

Friedman's analysis of Rogers' theory reveals it as a metaphor for our culture--a metaphor revealing a longing for more community without a community oriented vocabulary. This desire for community without a language of community is a major theme in Habits of the Heart. [35] Our individualistic language gets in the way of our desire for community. Psychologism has become the "therapeutic" ground for the nurturing of individualism.[36]

> This ambiguity [of attempting to build community on a psychologistic foundation] comes through particularly clearly in Rogers' most recent book, A Way of Being, in which he puts forward two different and, in some ways incompatible, touchstones of reality--self-actualization and the I-Thou relationship. In one place he writes of the 'actualizing tendency as the fundamental answer to the question of what makes an organism tick.' In another he writes....'Such a deep and mutual encounter [I-Thou relationship] does not happen often, but I am convinced that unless it happens occasionally, we are not living as human beings.'....these two touchstones of reality are not really compatible.[37]

Friedman rejects Rogers' blending of self-actualization and an I-Thou vocabulary. Friedman is concerned about some fundamental differences in pursuing self-actualization and the I-Thou relationship, which gives rise to opposing images of the person, individualism and community sensitivity, respectively.

Geller, in "The Failure of Self-Actualization Theory: A Critique of Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow," is in agreement with the conclusion of Friedman. He states that the self-actualization theme is at odds with the actual mission of community and results in an atomic perception of the individual.

> ...self-actualization theory (not merely those of Rogers and Maslow)...bears a striking resemblance to dehumanized forms of interaction. Just as the dehumanized personality can form only instrumental relationships with others, so the self-actualizing personality must use others as vehicles for self-actualization. For all self-actualization theorists, self-actualization is the

> self-conscious goal of human life, that which gives it meaning and direction. To seek self-actualization does not preclude a concern for others or the formation of nonauthoritarian and nonexploitative relationships. But insofar as these relationships are indispensable to the journey of self-actualization, they are valuable only as a means to this end. The other exists only as a vehicle for my fulfillment. It makes little difference that Maslow, Rogers, and others insist that self-actualization involves transcendence of this instrumentality. As long as self-actualization remains the self-conscious end of human life, that toward which we should strive, it is impossible to transcend instrumentality. Only if self-actualization is no longer actively sought is genuine community possible.[38]

Geller views Rogers' project as an irony. He believes Rogers does want community, but his emphasis on self-actualization makes this impossible. Geller further suggests that a "relationship of community" can only be obtained if the project of self-actualization is abandoned,[39] which continues to be a major component of Rogerian theory.[40] Friedman cites a similar confusion in Rogers' two descriptions of empathy. At times, Rogers is close to Buber's understanding of "inclusion" and "experiencing the other side of the relationship" and at other times his definition approximates a psychologized version of empathy critiqued by Buber.[41] Friedman asserts that this confusion is apparent in the following quotation from Rogers' <u>A Way of Being.</u>

> In his essay, "Empathic: An Unappreciated Way of Being," Rogers quotes his own 1959 definition of empathy as sensing the other's inner feelings as if they were his own without losing sight of the 'as if' and falling into identification [similar to Buber's inclusion]. In this same essay, however, he updates his views on empathy in a way that sometimes resembles 'inclusion' and sometimes empathy in the narrower sense: 'An empathic way of being with another person.... means <u>entering the private perceptual world of the other</u> and becoming thoroughly at home in it. It involves being sensitive, moment by moment, to the changing felt meanings which flow in this other person, to the fear or rage or tenderness or confusion or whatever that he or she is experiencing....It means frequently checking with the person as to the accuracy of your sensings, and being guided by the responses. [A psychologized understanding of empathy.][42]

Friedman's concern is that Rogers continues to bring two different approaches together. Briefly one can describe these two approaches to empathy as follows: (1) "limiting," with the qualifying "as if," which is akin to Buber's "experiencing the other side of the relationship" without losing one's own ground and (2) "unlimiting," with a desire to "enter the other's perceptual world and become thoroughly at home in it." The first form of empathy sets limits on one's involvement in another's world, but the second invites a giving up of oneself to the other.

Granted Rogers is best known for the "as if" qualification on empathy. This view makes a solid and helpful contribution. But when vocabulary without this "as if" limitation continues to appear, as it did in the material quoted by Friedman, confusion occurs. It seems that Rogers can only with great difficulty put constraints on the self; even as he speaks of I-Thou, the center of his philosophy still remains self-actualization, according to Friedman.[43]

Rogers' acceptance of the human as "unqualifiedly good" seems to make limits more difficult for him to accept. Rogers contends that if one can only get a patient to reach down into his depths, he or she will discover a nature that is social and constructive.[44] This viewing of the human as innately good at the core of his or her being encourages an unleashing of the self in touch with the positive direction of the "organismic impulses" striving toward self-actualization. This "unqualifiedly good" perspective also invites an empathic involvement with few limits, because one's impulses will be naturally appropriate and good.

Rogers' position on the innate goodness of the person is critiqued by Rollo May in an open letter to Rogers. May stated his own recognition

of the daimonic urge for good and evil, as a contrast to Rogers' innately good perspective. With regret, May quoted Warren Bennis' critique of Rogers' viewpoint as "devilishly innocent."[45] Finally May stated:

> I am pleading for a realistic approach to human evil. A colleague tells me that when you had a discussion with Martin Buber in Michigan you said, 'Man is basically good,' and Buber answered, 'Man is basically good--and evil.' I am arguing that we must include a view of the evil in our world and in ourselves no matter how much that evil offends our narcissism.[46]

Viewing the person as innately good results in fewer limitations than that of conceptualizing the human as good and evil. Individualism is grounded in ever increasing potentials; but community, on the other hand, places limits on individual action. Some people may engage in behavior that benefits themselves, but is detrimental to a larger group. Buber uses the metaphor of the "narrow ridge" to stress the importance of both individual and collective efforts.[47] Friedman refers to this understanding of community that limits individual and collective abuses as the "community of otherness."[48] The "narrow ridge" and the "community of otherness" are vastly different linguistic realities than that of self-actualization. Rogers is more willing to unleash, due to his positive assessment of human nature. Friedman and Buber, in contrast, want to establish limits, as they conceive of the human as both good and evil.[49]

In The Confirmation of Otherness Friedman further describes the significance of the difference in world view or images of the person generated by Rogers' enthusisam for the inner goodness of the person. At this point the psychologism of Rogers is most apparent; it is the inner person that motivates. It is this "image of the human" that nourishes individualism.

> Equally serious is the tendency on Rogers' part to see what is happening...in terms of Either/Or--the individual versus the society or the organic whole, the inner versus the outer....For this reason, he claims that 'the locus of evaluation is in the person, not outside'; and that 'the good life is within, not dependent on outside sources.' The young woman who goes from a Rogers workshop to face 800 people at a public county school board meeting around the issue of racial integration reports her experience in typical Rogerian terminology of the organism: 'I felt, more fully than ever before, my strength and confidence in my organism.' The organic analogy which Rogers uses to explain ...is inadequate to capture the reality of the community of otherness...50

The stressing of the either/or of individual versus society with a trusting of the former and a distrusting of the latter is present in Rogers' recent writings. Rogers makes this point in a critique of May. "So my experience leads me to believe that it is cultural influences which are the major factor in our evil behaviors."[51] In an even more recent article Rogers states the need to permit "...the client to choose the directions for his or her life, if we rely on the wisdom of the organism in making such choices, and if we see our role as releasing the client from constraining self-perceptions to become a more complete potential self..."[52] This optimistic view of the person makes it difficult to take Rogers' views on such complex issues as nuclear weapons seriously. His arguments rest on trust of the individual organism without enough recognition of ideological and political structures that give birth to differences.[53]

For Friedman, Rogers' psychologistic stressing of the inner person embraces an individualistic "image of the person." However, what is most fascinating to this author is that as Friedman critiques Rogers' orientation, he simultaneously states that Rogers' orientation is close to his own "community of otherness."[54] Rogers' psychologistic vocabulary points in that direction, but falls short of community, leaving us with an

individualistic language of organism and self-actualization.

I agree with Anderson that there are those more psychologistic in orientation than Rogers[55] but again, this is what makes Rogers' theory most fascinating. The emphasis on organismic impulses and a turning toward the inner person is in contrast with Rogers' emphasis on a community of relationship. Rogers' incongruence is not unlike that of much of contemporary America. We want community, but we often do not have a sufficient vocabulary to nurtue and sustain human community.

In summary of this section, the contemporary importance of Rogers' theory is that it can be viewed as a metaphor representing the confusion of individualism and community. Rogers' vocabulary is so close to Buber's "narrow ridge" and Friedman's "community of otherness," yet it falls short of community. The psychologistic emphasis on the inner self, organismic impulses and the innate goodness of the person lead us to individualism, not community. Rogers' project reveals the dilemma described in Habits of the Heart. How do we sustain community when our interpersonal communication is so steeped in individualistic language?

The next section examines how therapeutic language, in general, assists the individual self, not the community. It is not just particular psychological theories which have ignored a community rhetoric. Many in our society, not specifically trained in psychology but exposed to therapeutic language, experience a similar ethical dilemma in their daily interpersonal communication, as detailed by the authors of Habits of the Heart.

Habits of the Heart

Habits of the Heart is not only a book title, but a metaphor for the intellectual and cultural mores that sustain and undergird a community. The term "habits of the heart" was coined by French social philosopher, Alexis de Tocqueville. Tocqueville published the first two volumes of Democracy in America in 1835. In that classic study of American life he coined "habits of the heart" as a description of the intellectual mores that undergird a community and culture.

> I have said earlier that I consider mores to be one of the great general causes responsible for the maintenance of a democratic republic in the United States.
>
> I here mean the term 'mores' (moeurs) to have its original Latin meaning; I mean it to apply not only to "Moeurs" in the strict sense, which might be called the habits of the heart, but also to the different notions possessed by men, the various opinions current among them, and the sum of ideas that shape mental habits.
>
> So I use the word to cover the whole moral and intellectual state of a people....I am only looking for the elements in them which help support political insitutions.56

Like Tocqueville, the authors of Habits of the Heart use the phrase in a broad-based fashion, lumping together the intellectual grounding that bonds people together with the term, "habits of the heart." This metaphor, like that of Rogers' interpersonal dialogue, is tied to two different world views, individualism and community. American life seems to revolve in oxymoronic tension around two different "habits of the heart": individualism and community. Of the two "habits," individualism is currently the strongest in our culture, while the notion of community is the most longed for, according to the authors of Habits of the Heart.

> American culture has long been marked by acute ambivalence about the meshing of self-reliance and community, and the nation's history shows a similar ambivalence over the question of how to combine individuals autonomy and the interrelationship of a complex modern economy....But if the fears of Madison, Tocqueville, and Debs seem today to be becoming alarmingly true,

> then perhaps their hopes can speak to us as well. They believed that the survival of a free people depends on the revival of a public virtue that is able to find political expression [that works for the common good of the community, not just oneself].57

Tocqueville's 19th century warning of the tendency of individualism to overwhelm community[58] is consistent with the current conclusion of Robert Bellah and his fellow co-authors in Habits of the Heart. The "habit" of individualism seems stronger than that of community in contemporary society, continuing to isolate us from one another.[59] To illustrate their point of the power of individualism and the desire for community without a proper language to sustain it, the authors of Habits of Heart tell the stories of many Americans, using four persons as "representative" examples.

One of their "representative" characters was Brian Palmer. Brian was a successful upper echelon manager, who has worked long hours and struggled to succeed in his career. "In many ways, Brian's is an individual success story. He has succeeded materially..."[60] Brian, however, discovered that single-minded devotion to career was not enough. A divorce and responsibility of children altered his perspective; he began to want a greater sense of community via his family. Bellah and associates discovered, however, that when Brian was asked to justify his move from individualism to a more community oriented ethic he had difficulty doing so. Brian lacked a vocabulary necessary, according to the authors, to fully nurture and sustain a community commitment. The following two quotations provide a good look at this orientation.

> Despite the combination of tenderness and admiration he expresses for his wife, the genuine devotion he seems to feel for his children, and his own resilient self-confidence, Brian's justification of his life thus rests on a fragile foundation. Morally, his life appears much more coherent than when he was dominated by careerism, but, to hear him talk, even his deepest

> impulses of attachment to others are without any more solid foundation than his momentary desires. He lacks a language to explain what seem to be the real commitments that define his life, and to that extent the commitments themselves are precarious.61

> His [Brian's] increased commitment to family and children rather than to material success seems strangely lacking in substantive justification. 'I just find that I get more personal satisfaction from choosing course B over course A....Brian's justification of his life thus rests on a fragile foundation....He lacks a language to explain what seem to be the real commitments that define his life, and to that extent the commitments themselves are precarious.62

The significance of wanting community without a language to sustain it, according to the authors of Habits of the Heart, is that Brian is more a prototype than the exception. The language of individualism is so common and powerful in everyday speech that it overshadows the language of community. It seems the desire for community is hindered by a language too individually grounded to provide a solid foundation. We require, but nevertheless, seem to lack an everyday language capable of transcending our own "radical individualism."[63]

The dominance of this problem is, of course, reinforced by Friedman's critique of Rogers' individualistic language. Rogers' reliance on the psychologistic language of the real self, following organismic impulses, and entering the perceptual world of another provides us with an individualistic language trying to restore individual mental health.

Unlike Friedman, the authors of Habits of the Heart do not refer directly to Rogers' work.[64] But they do address the close connection between individualism and humanistic psychology.

> ...humanistic ... psychologists [question and at times reject the significance of].... external authority, cultural tradition, and social institutions.... The self in all its pristine purity is affirmed.... [S]uch romantic individualism is remarkably thin when it comes to any but the vaguest prescriptions about how to live in an actual society.[65]

The connection between humanistic psychology and individualism has permitted this "therapeutic vocabulary" and "therapeutic attitude" to become part of our everyday language and meaning structure. Such a therapeutic orientation or attitude, according to Bellah, increases individual autonomy, the pursuit of self-actualization, and a reluctance to sacrifice for another.[66] This therapeutic language celebrates the individual.

> ...social bonds are those based on the free choices of authentic selves....the only valid contract is one based on negotiation between individuals acting in their own self-interest.... No binding obligations and no wider social understanding justify a relationship. It exists only as the expression of the choices of the free selves who make it up. And should it no longer meet their needs, it must end.[67]

Bellah and associates, however, do not see the language of therapeutic individualism as necessarily generated from narcissism. They do not question motivations, but rather critique the language that sets limits on one's perspective of life.[68] Similarly, Rogers' orientation is guided by good motivations. But the language interferes with community association. The authors of Habits of the Heart use a therapist, Margaret Oldham, as an example of this phenomenon. She is motivated to help people. It is her vocabulary, however, that leads to individualism, not community. Phrases, such as "taking responsibility for oneself," and "self-reliance" lace therapeutic and everyday vocabulary.[69]

The consequence of the therapeutic language of individualism combining with the individual roots of this culture results in a "culture of isolation"[70] and, at best, a limited sense of community. Such an orientation is likely to define community in terms of quality of "lifestyle," not commitment and service.[71] A community of the

"like-minded" is sought to enrich and reinforce one's own interests.[72] Friedman makes a similar point in his critique of the "community of affinity."[73] Bellah and associates provide us with a picture of therapeutic language individualism leading us away from community and back to an "American Dream" of individual fulfillment.[74]

The power of the critique provided by the authors of Habits of the Heart is akin to that offered by Friedman. Friedman recognized two languages in Rogers' therapy, one of individual self-actualization and the other of the I-Thou and community. Bellah recognizes that we in America have not one "American Dream," but two, the first of individual fulfillment and the second of community.

> The American Dream is often a very private dream of being the star, the uniquely successful and admirable one, the one who stands out from the crowd of ordinary folk who don't know how. And since we have believed in that for a long time and worked very hard to make it come true, it is hard for us to give it up, even though it contradicts another dream that we have--that of living in a society that would really be worth living in.[75]

The authors of Habits of the Heart provide a number of solutions promoting the invitation of human community in their last chapter, "Transforming American Culture."[76] Their solutions are primarily related to structural changes. But throughout the book they point to three important notions for developing a language to invite community in interpersonal communication. First, community does not rest primarily on feelings, but rather on a commitment to principles and values that bond people together. In short, we need to reverse the implications of the following quotation.

> The objectified moral goodness of Winthrop obeying God's will or Jefferson following nature's laws turns into the subjective goodness of getting what you want and enjoying it. Utility replaces duty; self-expression unseats authority. 'Being good' becomes 'feeling good'.... Given this individualistic moral

> framework, the self becomes a crucial site for the comparative examination and probing of feelings that result from utilitarian acts and inspire expressive ones.[77]

Bellah and associates point to the need for a rhetoric tied to something beyond individual feelings. They seem to be pointing to the importance of Eubanks' "civilizing values"[78] and Weaver's pursuit of the Ideal.[79] But they want to ground ideals in the historicality of the community, not in a Platonic ideal. They suggest that the emphasis on the self and feelings are not wrong in interpersonal communication sensitive to community; it is just that they are secondary to principles that bond the people together.

Second, relationship cannot be considered the most important term in communication from a community perspective. Again there is a desire to recognize that values and principles are needed to bond the relationships, not just positive feelings and utility.

> The limitation for millions of Americans who remain stuck in the duality in one form or another is that they are deprived of a language genuinely able to mediate among self, society, the natural world and ultimate reality. Frequently, they fall back on abstractions when talking about the most important things. They stress 'communication' as essential to relationships without adequately considering what is to be communicated. They talk about 'relationships' but cannot point to the personal virtues and cultural norms that give relationships meaning and value.[80]

The implication is that a community sensitive rhetoric of interpersonal communication views relationships as a by-product of a common life together, not the goal. Again, there is no dislike of relationship; it is simply considered a secondary emphasis that emerges as a by-product of a community vocabulary of commitment, sacrifice, loyalty, and principle.

Finally, interpersonal communication sensitive to community is grounded in a "community of memory." It takes time, a willingness to stay in one spot long enough to embrace the stories and dramas that bind the

people together. The dream of individual success in our culture requires the individual to uproot community to follow the road of success. Mobility, not community, has become a trademark in such a lifestyle, described by Whyte in The Organization Man in the 1950's.[81] Instead of movement, the authors of Habits of the Heart offer a willingness to become part of the drama or story, to become a participant in the community of memory.[82] Their suggestion is akin to that of Fisher's connecting of story or narrative to involvement in public moral argument.[83] The above authors seek a vocabulary that can ground a story of community, not just individual pursuits. For our discipline's commitment to choice-making as central to communication ethics to be followed, linguistic sensitivity to vocabulary inviting community and individualism is required. Only when both options are visible can we begin to examine the contributions of each and the ethical implications of how they work separately and in combination in daily interpersonal communication.

Research Implications for Interpersonal Ethics

Friedman's examination of Rogers' theory and the sociological study by the authors of Habits of the Heart reveal a significant question in interpersonal ethics. Is interpersonal communication instruction unethical, if we do not provide a choice of vocabularies--one inviting individualism and the other community? The critique offered by Friedman and the authors of Habits suggest that "therapeutic language," in general, often limits community with its individualistic grounding.

As stated earlier, communication ethics has most often involved choicemaking.[84] The ethics or choicemaking implications for

understanding the contemporary interpersonal communication are two-fold. First, if Friedman and the authors of Habits of the Heart are correct in their assertion that many people desire community, but are hampered in that pursuit by individualistic language, then we must ask what linguistic set of assumptions undergird our professional understanding of interpersonal communication? Would a content analysis of current interpersonal communication texts uncover language encouraging individualism, stressing feeling, self, and I or that of community addressing tradition, collective association, and a "community of memory?"

Second, what is our specific ethical charge in interpersonal communication? Are we to encourage community in our theory making or individualism? Or should our theory be so sensitive to the historical situation that when the need for less emphasis on community emerges a strong individual response is nourished and vice versa. Granted, most theories, like Rogers' "person-centered approach" stress both individualism and community. But the crucial issue is where the largest percentage of emphasis is placed at a particular time. In short, our ethical charge, if we are to be alert to the warnings of Friedman and the authors of Habits of the Heart, is to offer a language of community due to its lack and the dominance of individualistic language. A community approach to interpersonal communication would assert the importance of a common life together in a time when, according to the above authors, it is looked for without a rhetoric to sustain the pursuit.

Returning to Ayres' review of four approaches to interpersonal communication, he stated that the dialogic approach would be increasingly challenged by a rhetorical orientation to interpersonal communication. Ayres suggested a move from concentration on self to examination of

rhetorical purpose, motive, and goal.[85] His conclusion appears to be congruent with the implications of the work of Friedman and the authors of Habits of the Heart. They too are suggesting a rhetorical shift in strategy from individual to community, from feelings to principles, from the "here and now" to a "community of memory," and from self-fulfillment to commitment.

Making such an option available in our rhetoric about interpersonal communication opens the possibility of interpersonal ethics in terms of choice-making. Additionally, in light of the current strength of individualistic vocabulary and in the best of a dialectical spirit, it may be time to turn to a strategy of community, not as the total answer, but as another choice and as a counter-weight to the status-quo in interpersonal communication discussions.

In summary, the proposal of this article is both modest and demanding. The authors of Habits and the scholarship of Friedman are not suggesting that an individualistic approach to interpersonal communication is wrong. However, from a standard of choice-making it is not ethical if a community based approach to interpersonal communication is not available. Again, the suggestion of this author is to provide a choice, not a replacement of current theory. Our charge as ethical choice-makers is to present the possibility of choice before an ethical evaluation of the merits of individualistic and community oriented choices to interpersonal communication can commence. In short, this article has laid the groundwork for recognizing an ethical problem of the lack of choice in much of our everyday interpersonal vocabulary. The next immediate task is to examine how a more community sensitive approach to interpersonal communication might be described and how it would contrast with and

complement current interpersonal communication theory.

FOOTNOTES

1. Joesph A. Ilardo, "Why Interpersonal Communication?" Communication Education, 21 (Winter, 1972), 1-6.

2. John Stewart, "An Approach to the Basic Course," Communication Education, 21 (Winter, 1972), 7-14.

3. Joe Ayres, "Four Approaches to Interpersonal Communication: Review, Observation, Prognosis," Western Journal of Speech Communication, 48 (Fall, 1984), 409.

4. Ayres, 410.

5. Ayres, 421-422.

6. See Rob Anderson, "Phenomenological Dialogue, Humanistic Psychology, and Pseudo-Walls: A Response and Extension," Western Journal of Speech Communication, 46 (Fall, 1982), 344-357; Ronald C. Arnett, "Toward a Phenomenological Dialogue," Western Journal of Speech Communication, 45 (Summer, 1981), 201-212; and Ronald C. Arnett, "Rogers and Buber: Similarities, Yet Fundamental Differences," Western Journal of Speech Communication, 46 (Fall, 1982), 358-372.

7. See for example, James W. Chesebro, "A Construct for Assessing Ethics in Communication," Central States Speech Journal (Summer, 1969), 104-107; Richard L. Johannesen, Ethics in Human Communication (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1978); J. Vernon Jensen, "An Analysis of Recent Literature on Teaching Ethics in Public Address, Speech Teacher, 8 (Fall, 1959), 219-228; and Ronald C. Arnett, "The Status of Ethics Scholarship in Speech Communication Journals from 1915 to 1985," (Presented at the Speech Communication Association National Convention, Denver, Colorado, November, 1985).

8. Ernest G. Bormann, "Ethics and Small Group Communication," Speech Association of Minnesota Journal, 12 (Fall, 1985), 20.

9. Martin Buber, Between Man and Man: The Knowledge of Man (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 166-184.

10. Unfortunately, Dr. Friedman was unable to attend the Conference, due to illness. The seminar, centering on his understanding of confirmation, proceeded with constant reference to his work. He will, however, be a respondent to an interpersonal dialogue panel at SCA in Chicago in 1986.

11. See for example, Maurice Friedman, The Confirmation of Otherness in Family, Community, and Society (New York: The Pilgrim Press, 1983), 29-32.

12. Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann

Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton, Habits of the Heart: Individualism, and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 50.

13. Bellah, 153.

14. Carl R. Rogers, "Toward a More Humane Science of the Person," Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 25 (Fall, 1985), 7-30.

15. Sylvia Slack, "Reflections on a Workshop with Carl Rogers," Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 25 (Spring, 1985), 35-42.

16. Diane C. Mader, "What Are They Doing to Carl Rogers," Et Cetera, 37 (Winter, 1980), 314-320.

17. Martin Buber, Between Man and Man (New York: Macmillan Company, 1972, 104-117.

18. Howard Kirschenbaum, On Becoming Carl Rogers (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1979, 138.

19. See for example, Maurice Friedman, The Hidden Human Image (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1974).

20. See for example, Maurice Friedman, The Confirmation of Otherness in Family, Community, and Society.

21. See for example, Maurice Friedman, "Psychology and Religion: The Limits of the Psyche as a Touchstone of Reality," Touchstones of Reality: Existential Trust and the Community of Peace (E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1974), 247-259.

22. Ronald C. Arnett, "Toward A Phenomenological Dialogue," 201-212; and "Rogers and Buber: Similarities, Yet Fundamental Differences," 358-372.

23. Maurice Friedman, "Healing Through Meeting: Martin Buber and Psychotherapy," Cross Currents, 5 (1955), 304-307.

24. Maurice Friedman, "Touchstones of Reality: An Autobiographical Journey," Inward Light, (Fall, 1970), 18.

25. Maurice Friedman, "The Ontology of the Between," Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, 11 (1972), 183-190.

26. Martin Buber, A Believing Humanism: Gleanings (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), 151; quoted in Maurice Friedman, "The Self and the World: Psychologism and Psychotherapy in Martin Buber's I and Thou, Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, 15 (Winter, 1977), 171-172.

27. Maurice Friedman, The Hidden Human Image, 280-281.

28. Richard Stanton, "Maurice Friedman's Philosophy of the Human Image: The Foundation for His Critique of Contemporary Psychology," Contemporary Psychology: Revealing and Obscuring the Human, Maurice Friedman, (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1984), 8-9.

29. Friedman, Contemporary Psychology, 55.

30. Stanton, 4.

31. Maurice Friedman, The Human Way: A Dialogic Approach to Religion and Human Experience (Chambersburg, PA: Anima Books, 1982), 63.

32. Friedman, The Hidden Human Image, 4.

33. Rob Anderson, 344-357.

34. Maurice Friedman, The Healing Dialogue in Psychotherapy (New York: Jason Aronson, Inc., 1985), 48-55.

35. Bellah, 290.

36. Bellah, 128-130.

37. Friedman, The Healing Dialogue in Psychotherapy, 55.

38. Leonard Geller, "The Failure of Self-Actualization Theory: A Critique of Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow," Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 22 (Spring, 1982), 71.

39. Geller, 72-73.

40. See for example, Edward H. Robinson, III, "Education for the 1980's and Beyond: An Interview with Carl Rogers," Journal of Humanistic Education and Development, 23 (Spring, 1985), 102.

41. Buber, Between Man and Man, 96-98.

42. Friedman, The Healing Dialogue in Psychotherapy, 199-200.

43. Friedman, Contemporary Psychology, 57.

44. Friedman, Contemporary Psychology, 213.

45. Rollo May, "The Problem of Evil: An Open Letter to Carl Rogers," The Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 22 (Fall, 1982), 13.

46. May, 18-19.

47. Maurice Friedman, Martin Buber: The Knowledge of Man (University of Chicago Press, 1976), 3.

48. Friedman, The Confirmation of Otherness, 27-36 and 249-260.

49. Friedman, Contemporary Psychology, 213.

50. Friedman, The Confirmation of Otherness, 150-151.

51. Carl R. Rogers, "Notes on Rollo May," Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 22 (Fall,1982), 8; see also Rogers, "Reply to Rollo May's Letter to Carl Rogers," Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 22 (Fall, 1982), 87; and Maurice Friedman, "Comment on the Rogers-May Discussion of Evil," Journal of Humanstic Psychology, 12 (Fall, 1982), 93-96.

52. Carl R. Rogers, "Reaction to Gunnison's Article on the Similarities Between Erickson and Rogers," Journal of Counseling and Development, 63 (May, 1985), 566.

53. Carl R. Rogers, "A Psychologist Looks at Nuclear War: Its Threat, Its Possible Prevention," Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 22 (Fall, 1982), 9-22.

54. Friedman, The Confirmation of Otherness, 150.

55. Anderson, 356-357.

56. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. George Lawrence, ed. J.P. Mayer (New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1969), 264.

57. Bellah, 256 & 271.

58. Bellah, viii.

59. Bellah, 128.

60. Bellah, 5.

61. Bellah, 8.

62. Bellah, 8.

63. Bellah, 21.

64. Rogers' work is specifically mentioned three times in Habits of the Heart. See Bellah, 14, 98, and 347.

65. Bellah, 81.

66. Bellah, 98-104.

67. Bellah, 197.

68. Bellah, 290.

69. Bellah, 56.

70. Bellah, 285.

71. Bellah, 72.

72. Bellah, 251.

73. Friedman, The Community of Otherness, 133-151.

74. Bellah, 285.

75. Bellah, 285.

76. Bellah, 275-296.

77. Bellah, 77-78.

78. Ralph T. Eubanks, "Reflections on the Moral Dimension of Communication," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 45 (Spring, 1980), 297-312.

79. Richard Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948).

80. Bellah, 237.

81. William H. Whyte, The Organization Man (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1957).

82. Bellah, 152-155 and 252.

83. Walter R. Fisher, "Narrative as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument," Communication Monographs, 51 (Spring, 1984), 1-22.

84. See for example Thomas Nilsen, well-known for this perspective, Ethics of Speech Communication, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1974).

85. Ayres, 421-422.